Using conservation auctions informed by environmental performance models to reduce agricultural nutrient flows into Lake Erie  by Palm-Forster, Leah H. et al.
Journal of Great Lakes Research 42 (2016) 1357–1371
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Great Lakes Research
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r .com/ locate / jg l rUsing conservation auctions informed by environmental performance
models to reduce agricultural nutrient ﬂows into Lake ErieLeah H. Palm-Forster a,⁎,1, Scott M. Swinton b, Todd M. Redder c, Joseph V. DePinto c, Chelsie M.W. Boles c
a Department of Applied Economics and Statistics, University of Delaware, 531 S. College Ave., Newark, DE 19716-2103, USA
b Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics, Michigan State University, 446 W. Circle Dr., East Lansing, MI 48824-1039, USA
c LimnoTech, 501 Avis Drive, Ann Arbor, MI 48108, USA⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: leahhp@udel.edu (L.H. Palm-Forster).
1 This research was conducted while L. H. Palm-For
Michigan State University.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jglr.2016.08.003
0380-1330/© 2016 International Association for Gre
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).a b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 31 December 2015
Accepted 14 June 2016
Available online 21 August 2016
Review coordinated by John KerrCost-effectively mitigating agricultural nutrient export requires an understanding of the biophysical characteris-
tics of cropland as well as the behavioral and economic factors that drive landmanagement decisions. Conserva-
tion auctions informed by models that simulate environmental outcomes have the potential to allocate
conservation payments cost-effectively by funding practices that provide high predicted environmental beneﬁts
per dollar spent. This research tested two forms of conservation auctions. First, experimental auctionswere used
to analyze farmer preferences for different types of ﬁnancial incentives for voluntary conservation, including di-
rect payments, insurance, tax credits, and stewardship certiﬁcation beneﬁts. Second, conservation auctions were
conducted in two Ohio counties to evaluate performance under real-world conditions. Supporting both types of
auctions, the Soil andWater Assessment Tool (SWAT) predicted reductions in phosphorus exported as a function
of the type of conservation practice and farm location. Results of the experimental auctions showed direct pay-
ments and tax credits to be the most cost-effective incentives to mitigate phosphorus export. The real auctions
yielded two important lessons: 1) participation was very low, due to perceived transaction costs of
participation—especially on rented ﬁelds and for group bids, and 2) the cost-effectiveness ranking of bids was
highly sensitive to the parameters for soluble reactive phosphorus concentrations in the SWAT model. Future
socio-economic research into payment for environmental services programs should seek cost-effective mecha-
nisms with lower transaction costs for participants. Future biophysical research should strengthen our under-
standing of the factors governing soluble reactive phosphorus movement, so that models like SWAT can be
more reliably parameterized.
© 2016 International Association for Great Lakes Research. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Index words:
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In the Great Lakes region, agricultural nutrient loss via surface runoff
and subsurface drainage is threatening aquatic ecosystems. In 2011, a
harmful algal bloom (HAB) (Microcystis sp.) of unprecedented size
and severity occurred in the Western Lake Erie Basin (WLEB)
(Michalak et al., 2013). In 2014, another HAB in theWLEB contaminated
water supplies for nearly half a million people living in and around To-
ledo, OH (Wynne et al., 2015). As a result of this and other coastal and
freshwater re-eutrophication problems, signiﬁcant effort is being dedi-
cated to identify strategies that reduce nutrient loss from land in high-
priority watersheds (US EPA, 2014, 2010).
In the United States, farmers generally hold the property rights to
manage their land as they choose; therefore, most agri-environmentalster was a doctoral student at
at Lakes Research. Published byprograms are voluntary andmany involve payments for ecosystem ser-
vices (PES) to create incentives to adopt conservation practices
(Kroeger and Casey, 2007; Norris et al., 2008). However, payments
must come from budgets, and budgets are constrained. Spending on
federally funded conservation programs is projected to be over $5.5 bil-
lion annually during the 5-year life of the 2014 Farm Bill (Lubben and
Pease, 2014). In order to make best use of these funds, there is growing
interest in designing more cost-effective programs in order to generate
greater beneﬁts with a limited conservation budget. Researchers and
practitioners have called for programs that “pay for performance,”
which refers to the desire to pay for environmental outcomes rather
than paying for practices or inputs without considering the resulting
impact on the environment (Sowa et al., 2016–in this issue; Weinberg
and Claassen, 2006; Winsten and Hunter, 2011).
In order to obtain the greatest environmental impact from limited
funds, two kinds of information are essential: 1) a reliable prediction
of environmental beneﬁts from using a best management practice
(BMP) on a speciﬁc ﬁeld, and 2) knowledge concerning the least costly
incentive that a farmer would be willing to accept in order to adopt thatElsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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ecosystem services (ES) that result from alternative farming practices.
While these models are not perfect predictors of ES changes, they pro-
vide a scientiﬁcally validated basis for paying for environmental perfor-
mance in PES programs. In practice, they can be used to predict
environmental improvements (e.g., reduced nutrient export) in order
to allocate payments to projects that will provide the greatest beneﬁt
per dollar spent.
On the cost side, the challenge is to identify the minimum payment
amount that farmerswould bewilling to accept in order to adopt a BMP.
That amount is based on direct costs, opportunity costs, risks, and per-
sonal beneﬁts that are speciﬁc to each farmer but not known accurately
by policy makers. One increasingly popular mechanism for allocating
scarce conservation funding is the conservation auction (also called a
procurement auction or reverse auction), because it can induce farmers
to reveal the minimum payment that they are willing to accept in order
to implement a BMP (Hellerstein et al., 2015). Conservation auctions
create a competitive environment in which land managers compete
for payments to fund BMPs.
Early auction-typemechanisms, like those used to enroll land in pre-
vious versions of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), evaluated
bids based on cost alone in order to maximize the number of acres en-
rolled (Reichelderfer and Boggess, 1988). The CRP has evolved over
the last 30 years to include a more complex bidding mechanism in
which land is scored and ranked using the Environmental Beneﬁts
Index (EBI) that considers the ES provided by the land and the cost
(e.g., the per-acre rental rate) to enroll the land in the program
(Jacobs et al., 2014). The bidding system used in the CRP differs from
the reverse auctions that we describe in this paper in two key ways.
First, acreage enrolled in the CRP is removed from production whereas
we describe an auctionmechanism for working lands that will continue
to be used for crop production. Second, the EBI provides a scoring sys-
tem for CRP applications, but environmental beneﬁts on submitted
acres are not predicted using biophysical models as in the auctions de-
scribed in this study.
Research has shown that auctions aremore cost-effective when bids
are evaluated based on both the cost of BMP implementation and the
predicted environmental beneﬁts estimated by appropriate biological
simulation models (Connor et al., 2008; Duke et al., 2013; Messer and
Allen, 2010; Rabotyagov et al., 2014). Fig. 1 illustrates a bid selectionFig. 1. Conceptual process model of this study. Farmers provide information about the cost of u
Understanding the costs and beneﬁts facilitates cost-effective transactions.process that accounts for both the payment required by a farmer and
the predicted environmental beneﬁts in allocating funds to the conser-
vation projects that provide the most environmental beneﬁt per dollar
spent. Compared to uniform payment programs, conservation auctions
have the potential to increase total environmental beneﬁts procured
with a limited budget (Selman et al., 2008). However, there is a need
for additional ﬁeld-testing in order to evaluate the feasibility of scaling
up the conservation auction approach, particularly when the program
targets working agricultural lands with heterogeneous production
practices.
One important factor inﬂuencing the potential cost-effectiveness of
reverse auctions is the incentive or payment mechanism offered. The
norm up to now has been offering a direct payment to the farmer. Pre-
vious research has focused on programs that offer cost-share or annual
stewardship payments (Claassen et al., 2008), but little is known about
farmer willingness to adopt BMPs in exchange for other incentives such
as tax credits, specialized insurance products, and beneﬁts associated
with stewardship certiﬁcation (e.g., price premiums,market access, rep-
utational beneﬁts).
In this study, we explored alternative payment incentives and the
feasibility of scaling up reverse auctions in the Maumee River basin to
promote adoption of BMPs that reduce phosphorus runoff to Lake Erie.
In the ﬁrst stage, we implemented four experimental reverse auctions
across the Maumee basin to understand farmer preferences among dif-
ferent types of conservation incentives. In these experimental auctions,
farmers received payment based on the budgeted performance of mock
farms to which they were assigned in the economic experiment, but
their auction bids did not affect BMPs implemented on their own real
farms. In the second stage, we conducted two public conservation auc-
tions in the Tifﬁn watershed, a subwatershed in the Maumee basin, in
order to assess how the auctions could be implemented in the real
world at farm ﬁeld scale. Farmers were invited to submit bids to imple-
ment BMPs on their own farms, thus the level of participation in the bid-
ding process was of particular interest.
For both sets of auctions, the Soil and Water Assessment Tool
(SWAT) was employed to predict changes in agricultural phosphorus
(P) watershed export (i.e., combined surface and subsurface delivery)
that would result from implementing the BMPs. Between the two sets
of auctions, the SWAT model was updated to a new version. It was
also called upon to predict the reduction in phosphorus export fromsing conservation practices, while ecological models predict the beneﬁts of these practices.
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been called upon to simulate for public program purposes. Thus a sec-
ondary research objective was to assess the potential of using the
SWATmodel to reliably predict P movement, including from new tech-
nologies like controlled drainage structures.
The remainder of the paper is structured somewhat unconventional-
ly. First, we provide background information about the SWATmodel de-
veloped and parameterized for this study. We then present methods
and results from the stage 1 experimental auctions. We follow by pre-
senting methods and results from the stage 2 Tifﬁn Watershed BMP
auctions.We closewith discussion and conclusions covering both stages
of the research.
Overview of the Soil and Water Assessment Tool
SWAT is a physically based, semi-empirical hydrologic and water
quality model that can be used to simulate and calibrate daily water-
shed conditions to streamﬂow and water quality data available for a
speciﬁc watershed area of interest (Gassman et al., 2007; Neitsch
et al., 2011). The model was originally developed for the USDA Agricul-
tural Research Service (ARS) in 1998 (Arnold et al., 1998). It has since
been adapted to numerous watersheds, including the Maumee River
basin and the Tifﬁn River watershed, located within the Maumee
basin (Bosch et al., 2011; LimnoTech, 2013).
SWAT represents non-contiguous land areas that have consistent
climate and drainage area characteristics (e.g., land use/cover, soil
type, and slope) as representative hydrologic response units (HRUs).
One or more user-deﬁned HRUs are nested within a speciﬁc sub-basin
(or subwatershed), which is nested within a larger drainage basin (wa-
tershed). For example, a particular sub-basinmight include a number of
physically separate (i.e., non-contiguous) but comparable agricultural
ﬁelds (i.e., based on similarities in crop rotation, soils, and slope) that,
if desired, can be represented by a singleHRU in SWAT rather than as in-
dividual ﬁelds. The simulation ofwatermovement in the HRUs associat-
ed with a particular sub-basin allows prediction of daily ﬂow and mass
loading of sediments and nutrients, such as P, from the land to a stream
reach associated with the sub-basin. Reaches representing individual
sub-basins are linked together in the model to represent the stream
network(s) within the watershed, and ﬂow and constituent mass are
routed through this network to the watershed mouth. Instream pro-
cesses represented for individual reaches in SWAT can result in either
an increase or a decrease in mass as constituents such as P are routed
through the stream network. Fig. 2 presents a conceptual diagram ofFig. 2. Conceptual diagram of the Maumee Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) model. Awater and nutrient ﬂows in the SWAT model, including the inputs re-
quired and the outputs generated.
For the actual and experimental reverse auctions, calibrated SWAT
models of the Maumee River basin and the Tifﬁn River watershed
were applied to simulate the reductions in phosphorus export that
would result from the implementation of speciﬁc BMP(s) for discrete
(actual or hypothetical) farm ﬁelds. Because BMP performance can
vary dramatically with soil type and topography, simulation provides
a potentially useful way to predict environmental performance of
BMPs at nonresearch sites where directmeasurement of environmental
outcomes is infeasible.Stage 1: experimental auctions
The primary objective of the experimental auctions was to evaluate
farmer preferences for alternative conservation incentives in order to
identify the most cost-effective incentive design. The secondary objec-
tiveswere to 1) evaluate howbids differed among four BMPs, and 2) an-
alyze group bids versus individual bids for the same BMPs. Prior
research has shown that farmers' willingness to accept PES to adopt
new BMPs depends on traits of both the farm (e.g., area, equipment,
soils, topography) and the farmer (e.g., attitudes, education, prefer-
ences) (Feder et al., 1985; Ma et al., 2012; Prokopy et al., 2008); there-
fore, the experimental auctions aimed to focus on how attitudes and
preferences affected farmer bids, abstracting from the physical traits of
the farm. This set of auctions also sought to evaluate farmer willingness
to cooperate by bidding jointly to implement one or more BMPs on ad-
jacent ﬁelds under different ownership.
The speciﬁc incentives of interest involved the following four
payment mechanisms: direct payment, direct payment with “green
insurance” (to protect against potential yield loss due to a BMP), in-
come tax credit, and price premium for crops produced with certiﬁed
stewardship. Preferences for the four incentives were evaluated by
determining how the magnitude of a farmer's bids differed among
the four incentives offered. Lower bids for a particular incentive
were indicative of a higher willingness to enroll in that type of pro-
gram. In other words, the farmer would require less ﬁnancial incen-
tive to adopt the BMP if that incentive were offered, relative to a
different type of incentive for which he or she would demand
more. Bids from individual farmers were also compared to bids
from pairs of farmers and to bids from farmers when a phosphorus
abatement target was announced for the entire group.dapted from Redder (2014). The key nutrient of interest for this research is phosphorus.
1360 L.H. Palm-Forster et al. / Journal of Great Lakes Research 42 (2016) 1357–1371Methods: experimental auctions
In order to separate out the inﬂuence of speciﬁc farm circum-
stances while facilitating research about coordinated ﬁeld manage-
ment, the experimental auction research was based on artiﬁcial
“mock farms” (Fig. 3). Farmer participants were asked to imagine
that they were the manager of a mock farm whose resources were
described on an information sheet given to each of them (Palm-
Forster, 2015). In a series of auction rounds, participants were
asked to submit bids for one or more of the following BMPs:
(1) cover crops, (2) reduced tillage, (3) spring fertilization instead
of fall fertilization, and (4) ﬁlter strips. Participants earned money
in the experiment based on the proﬁtability of their mock farms;
however, their decisions in the experiment were not linked to real
actions on farmland they owned.
A SWAT watershed model calibrated for the Maumee River basin
(Bosch et al., 2011) was used to support the experimental auction by
quantifying the beneﬁts of speciﬁc BMP options for themock farms pre-
sented to participants. The modeling evaluation included quantiﬁcation
of the “local” reduction in phosphorus export from individual mock
farms and also the effective reduction in phosphorus export at the
mouth of the Maumee River (i.e., based on simulating the effect of
instream processes on ultimate phosphorus delivery). The modiﬁed
Maumee basin SWAT model was used to evaluate and compile BMP ef-
fectiveness outcomes for each mock farm in advance of the experimen-
tal auction. This allowed the researchers to rank the bids during the
auction session in order to facilitate the experiment.
Sixteen mock farms were designed to represent corn and soybean
farms in the Maumee River basin. The individual mock farms were
modeled by incorporating 16 new HRUs into the Maumee River basin
SWAT model developed by Bosch et al. (2011). As shown in Fig. 3,
farms were grouped in four clusters that each included four farms, and
the clusters were positioned at various locations in the Maumee River
basin in order to introduce variability in the transport pathways and dis-
tance from a given farm cluster to theMaumee Rivermouth (as dictated
by the model's stream network). The clusters were assumed to beFig. 3.Mock farm cluster locations in the Maumeelocated in the St. Joseph River, Tifﬁn River, Lower Auglaize River, and
Lower Maumee River watersheds.
Model input parameters were conﬁgured for each mock farm by
consulting with experts to establish common cropping systems and
practices in the region. Acreage, cropping system (i.e., tillage, rotation),
and average crop priceswere held constant across farmswhile soil type,
average yield, and cost of conservation practices varied among mock
farms to account for the heterogeneity among farms in the region. For
simplicity, eachmock farm totaled 200 ac (81 hectares) andwas divided
into two 100-ac (40.5-ha) ﬁelds. Among the 16 mock farms, eight
unique geographic farm characteristics were established by assigning
unique soil types to each pair of farms based on the two dominant soil
types for the region in which each cluster was located.
Information was provided to participants about their mock farm, in-
cluding acreage, soil type, cropping system, average crop yield and
prices, baseline management practices, and costs of implementing con-
servation practices. Providing this information allowed us to control for
factors that may inﬂuence farmers' willingness to adopt conservation
practices, speciﬁcally the location effect on payment (soil type, location
in watershed), yield risk, opportunity cost of land (yield, price), and di-
rect cost of conservation practices. Participants were also told how
much it would cost them to implement each BMP on their mock farm.
Four BMP cost levels were assigned to the 16 mock farms using a
main-effects orthogonal design, and costs ranged roughly from 50% to
150% of the payment levels set forth by theNatural Resources Conserva-
tion Service (NRCS) Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP)
for Ohio in 2012.
Farmers were mailed personalized invitations to the experimental
auction meetings. To enhance credibility, cover letters explaining the
purpose of the meetings were co-signed by leaders in the agricultural
communities where each auction was held. The auctions were held at
four sites in the Maumee watershed. Upon arrival, participants were
asked to sign a consent form, to accept a $50 participation honorarium,
and to review the contents of a folder that included details about their
mock farm and general instructions. Farmers were told the purpose of
the auctions and informed that the auctions would be conducted inRiver basin used in the experimental auctions.
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which they would participate.
In the series of seven auction rounds, farmers submitted bids to
adopt conservation BMPs with different types of ﬁnancial incentives,
making decisions as if the mock farms were their own. In the ﬁrst four
rounds, farmers submitted bids individually for different types of incen-
tives. In the ﬁnal three rounds, farmers submitted bids jointly. The order
of the auction rounds was the same across the four sessions, so partici-
pants were always presented with the most familiar program ﬁrst. If
more sessions had been held, the order that the auctions were present-
ed to participants would have been varied to control for anchoring and
ordering effects that have been highlighted in the literature on experi-
mental auction design (Lusk and Shogren, 2007).
In the ﬁrst round of the auction, farmers submitted bids for a direct
payment, which is the most straightforward transaction and the one
typically used to promote voluntary conservation. Next, farmers were
asked to submit another bid for a direct payment if they were also pro-
vided with fully subsidized (i.e., free) green BMP insurance. In the fol-
lowing rounds, farmers submitted bids for a tax credit and then a
price premium per bushel that was tied to an environmental steward-
ship certiﬁcation.
In all auction rounds, three protocols were consistently followed.
First, farmers were invited to submit bids to adopt one or more of the
following three in-ﬁeld conservation practices: 1) cover crops, 2) con-
servation tillage, and 3) spring fertilization instead of fall fertilization.
Farmers could also submit bids on a fourth practice, planting a ﬁlter
strip, which would take that land out of crop production for the year.
If a farmer bid on more than one practice, then the group of practices
was evaluated as a package.
Second, the predicted reduction in total phosphorus (TP) export
from adopting the conservation practices proposed in each bid was cal-
culated using the Maumee River basin SWAT model. The SWAT model
was conﬁgured to generate a “baseline” simulation, including selected
soil types, land slopes, and representative management practices for
the region. Additional simulations were developed to represent the im-
plementation of each candidate BMP for each mock farm. Four BMPs
were modeled including the three ﬁeld conservation practices as well
as implementation of ﬁlter strips to treat surface runoff generated by
the farms. Each mock farm was simulated as a separate HRU that indi-
vidually contributed runoff and TP load to the stream network in the
model. For auctions in which farmers bid individually, no physical con-
nection between the farms was represented, and BMPs simulated for a
given farm had no inﬂuence on other mock farms. When farmers
were permitted to bid jointly, farmers were informed that ﬁlter strips
on one ﬁeld could ﬁlter a portion of the runoff from an adjacent upland
parcel. The results of the baseline and BMP simulations for each farm
were used to compile a matrix of results, which included local TP yields
(i.e., at the HRU scale), the ultimate TP yields to Lake Erie (i.e., taking
into account transport through the stream network), and simulated
corn and soybean crop yields. Based on this information, the relative
changes in TP and crop yields were computed for each of the individual
BMP scenarios relative to the baseline simulation. A spreadsheet tool
summarizing the results was developed in advance of the auction
event in order to facilitate rapid retrieval of results during the auction.
Third, bids were sealed and no information concerning outcomes
was provided between rounds. Additionally, farmers only learned
about bid acceptance at the end of the session; therefore, the potential
for learning and strategic bidding during the auctions was limited.
In the auctions for direct payments, direct paymentwith BMP insur-
ance, and tax credits, bids were ranked based on the predicted payment
per pound of reduced TP export, where the payment equaled the bid
submitted by the farmer. Mock contracts were offered to those farmers
whomade themost cost-effective bids (lowest cost per pound of TP re-
duction) until the budget was exhausted. The budget for each auction
was set at $100,000 experimental dollars, but this was unknown to
farmers.A different procedure was followed to evaluate bids for price pre-
miums. In those rounds, farmers bid for the price premium that they
would require in order to become certiﬁed for adopting all three in-
ﬁeld BMPs (cover crop, conservation tillage, no fall fertilization). Filter
strips were not required for the certiﬁcation. A Becker–DeGroot–
Marschak (BDM) mechanism was used to determine which bids were
accepted in the experiment (Becker et al., 1964). To implement the
BDM mechanism, participants submitted their bids and then random
prices were drawn from known distributions to determinewhowas ac-
cepted into the program. Possible premiums were between $0 and $1
for corn and $0 to $2 for soybeans, in one-cent increments. If the farmer
participant bid more than the randomly drawn price premium, the bid
was not accepted. If the farmer bid less than or equal to the premium
drawn, the bid was accepted and the price premium received by the
farmer was the price that was drawn. The BDMmechanismwas chosen
in order to mimic how this type of certiﬁcation programwould work in
reality. A price premiumwould be established, and then farmers would
decide whether or not theywere willing to adopt the required practices
for that amount of money. Additionally, the BDMmechanism gives par-
ticipants an incentive to bid the true amount of money that they would
require instead of bidding strategically. Note that the price premium is
based on BMP adoption alone, not on where the BMP is applied, so
site-speciﬁc environmental performance is not factored into the
contracting decision.
In the ﬁnal three rounds of the experimental auctions, farmers were
asked to submit bids jointly. In rounds ﬁve and six, farmers were paired
based on the locations of their mock farms such that neighboring
farmers were partnered together. In round ﬁve, farmers discussed
their bids together, but bid individually (Joint Contract 1). Then, in
round six, pairs of farmers submitted joint bids (Joint Contract 2). In
both rounds, farmers could individually decide which practices they
wanted to adopt and the level of payment that was required, but
farmers discussed their bids together. In the last round, participants
were asked to bid individually, but they were told that bids would not
be accepted unless, as a group, TP export was reduced by 50% without
exceeding the program budget. In this round, farmers were given addi-
tional information about the environmental vulnerability of their land
by telling them if their farmwas in a low-,medium-, or high-vulnerabil-
ity area. Farmers were informed that adopting BMPs on ﬁelds in high
vulnerability areas would result in more TP reductions than adopting
the same BMPs in medium or low priority areas. In these rounds,
farmers bid for the direct payment that they would require.
In addition to the $50 participation honorarium, participants re-
ceived payments based on their performance in the auctions. Perfor-
mance was measured by the total income generated by their mock
farm in all auction rounds. Net winnings in each round equaled the dif-
ference in farm proﬁts with and without the conservation program. So,
for example, the ﬁlter strip BMP that took land out of crop production
reduced crop revenues, but farmers could earn revenue from the new
incentive payment. The additional payments based on auction perfor-
mance ranged from $38 to $68 per auction participant, with an average
payment of $52. See Palm-Forster (2015) for additional details about
the implementation of the experimental auctions.
Results: experimental auctions
Fifty-one farmers participated in the experimental auctions. One
participant was not a corn and soybean farmer and another failed to
complete all of the questions, leaving 49 records eligible for the analysis.
Auction participants included in this analysis were recruited usingmail-
ing lists from county Soil and Water Conservation Districts (69%), Ohio
Farm Bureau (15%), an input supplier (10%), and property tax rolls (6%).
Since auction participants had been told the exact cost to their
mock farm of adopting each BMP, it was possible to calculate a “net
bid” for each BMP. Net bids were calculated as the amount the farmer
bid for that incentive transaction minus the assigned cost of BMP
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demanded more than their expected implementation cost to under-
take the BMP, whereas a negative net bid meant that the farmer was
willing to give up some expected proﬁt to adopt the BMP. Because
many farmers value environmental stewardship, a negative net bid
may be a rational statement of willingness to trade off income for im-
proved environmental quality.
The results from the experimental auctions shed light on all three
objectives. On the cost-effectiveness of the incentive types, the mean
net bidswere highest in the auction for paymentswith green insurance,
meaning that this was the least cost-effective option. As shown in
Table 1, net bids were lowest for the tax credit and the direct payment.
Bids for certiﬁcation price premiums were not signiﬁcantly higher
than bids for direct payments, but as shown in Fig. 4, the bids were
less cost-effective because payments were not spatially targeted. In
these rounds, farmers were told that they would be enrolled in the cer-
tiﬁcation premium if their bid was less than or equal to the randomly
drawn price premium. Rather than reporting randomly drawn pre-
miums, Fig. 4 presents the cost per pound reduction in TPwhen the cer-
tiﬁcation premium is set at themean premiumbid submitted across the
four auction sessions ($0.43/bu for corn and $0.90/bu for soybeans). As a
practice-based premium, it did not involve ranking based on potential
environmental beneﬁts from the BMPs. Instead, land is enrolled in the
program if the farmer is willing to accept the price premiums offered
(i.e., enrollment occurs if the bid submitted is less than or equal to the
per bushel price premiums). The resulting lack of spatial targeting ex-
plains the higher unit cost of TPmitigation under the price premium in-
centive mechanism.
Fig. 5 illustrates the relative cost and beneﬁts that could have been
generated based on bids submitted in the experimental auctions for
three in-ﬁeld practices. It is important to note, however, that the exact
values shown in the ﬁgure do not represent true costs or beneﬁts on
farmers' own ﬁelds because auction participants were submitting bids
for mock farms and they were told their costs of adopting each BMP.
Of particular interest are the relative differences among the number
and magnitude of bids submitted and the predicted reduction in TP ex-
port. Interestingly, although the direct cost of shifting P fertilization
from fall to spring was negligible ($0–3/ac ($0–$7.41/ha) on the mock
farms), the net bids showed that farmers demanded a signiﬁcant premi-
um above costs due to 1) the perceived time conﬂict in spring between
fertilization and planting activities and 2) concerns about soil compac-
tion in the spring (see Table 2). Fewer people bid to adopt this practice
and overall beneﬁts generated were less than the other BMPs, which is
reﬂected in the shorter cost–beneﬁt curve shown in Fig. 5. Among the
three in-ﬁeld BMPs examined, cover crops appeared to yield the most
TP reduction for a given budget although this practice was the most
expensive.
Net bids by pairs of farmers and individual farmers in the experi-
mental auctions were not signiﬁcantly different. Fig. 6 presents the
cost per pound (kilogram) of reduced phosphorus export. Although
overall costs per pound of reduced TP export did not consistently
change across the individual and group goal sessions, the variance inTable 1
Summary statistics of net bids (i.e., bidminus the cost of BMP implementation) for in-ﬁeld prac
Units are $/ac/yr ($/ha/yr). All 49 participants submitted bids in the auction for a conservation
actions. The participants who chose not to submit bids varied among the three auctions.
Auction transaction type n Mean
a) Payment 49 11.0
(27.2)
b) Payment with green insurance 47 24.0
(59.3)
c) Tax credit 47 3.4
(8.4)
d) Certiﬁcation price premium 47 8.7
(21.5)unit costs of TP mitigation increased between bids for individual pay-
ments (Individual Payment and Joint Contract 1) and bidswhen farmers
bid jointly (Joint Contract 2). In Joint Contract 1, bids were evaluated
jointly, but participants submitted their bids individually and were
paid individually. In Joint Contract 2, participants had to jointly agree
on a bid and agree on how the payment would be divided if their joint
bid was accepted. The standard deviation of unit costs for in-ﬁeld prac-
tices when participants bid individually and jointly was 22.1 and 37.7 $/
ac (54.6 and 93.2 $/ha), respectively. Results suggest that groupsmay be
affected by joint contracts differently. However, as we discuss in the
Conclusions section, it is not clear whether the group bidding behavior
displayed in the experimental auctions is representative of farmers'
true willingness to bid jointly because they did not opt to do so in real
auctions.
Consistent with previous research (Cason et al., 2003), there is
some evidence that the environmental vulnerability information
provided in the ﬁnal auction session caused farmers with vulnerable
lands to increase their bids to strategically extract larger payments
from the auctioneer. However, small sample size and the design of
our experiment limit our ability to draw causal inferences about
the effect of information on bidding behavior in multiple auction en-
vironments. A valuable contribution of future research would be to
test the impact of providing environmental information on partici-
pation decisions when farmers can submit bids individually and
jointly.
Stage 2: Tifﬁn Watershed BMP auctions
The results of the experimental auctions set the stage for scaling up
to a public auction at a county scale. Two reverse auctions were imple-
mented in the Tifﬁn Watershed, which is a subwatershed of the Mau-
mee River basin (Fig. 7). The auctions were administered by Michigan
State University with support from the Fulton Co. and Deﬁance Co.
Soil and Water Conservation District (SWCD) ofﬁces. The Tifﬁn Water-
shed BMP auctions used the direct payment incentive type, both be-
cause it was tied for the most cost-effective incentive in the
experimental auctions and because it was tractable for researchers to
implement with farmers (which a tax credit was not).
The TifﬁnWatershed BMP auctions began with three objectives, but
ended with four:
1) To ﬁeld-test reverse auctions for themost cost-effective payment in-
centive type under county-scale public auction conditions. Speciﬁc
sub-objectives were to evaluate how auction participation affects
cost-effectiveness of P abatement and to evaluate large-scale use of
SWAT on real farm ﬁelds.
2) To assess the willingness of different landowners to coordinate BMP
and submit joint bids, and to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of those
bids.
3) To test the effect on auction participation of providing landowners
with information on environmental vulnerability of speciﬁc ﬁelds
(as a clue to the likelihood of a winning bid).tices (cover crops, conservation tillage, and fall fertilization) among four transaction types.
payment; however, only 47 bids were submitted in the auctions for the alternative trans-
Std. dev. Min Median Max
22.7
(56.1)
−42.0
(−103.8)
7.0
(17.3)
64.0
(158.1)
61.8
(152.7)
−46.0
(−113.7)
3.0
(7.4)
249.0
(615.3)
30.1
(74.4)
−43.0
(−106.3)
−1.0
(−2.5)
96.0
(237.2)
40.3
(99.6)
−47.4
(−117.1)
2.3
(5.7)
134.2
(331.6)
Fig. 4.Costs per pound (per kg on right vertical axis) of total phosphorus (TP) abatement for experimental auctions for four contract types usingmock farms. Only accepted bids for in-ﬁeld
BMPs are represented. For each auction type, the cost per pound TP is calculated by dividing the total amount paid to farmers with accepted bids by the total predicted reduction in TP
export generated by funded practices.
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a conservation auction.Methods: Tifﬁn Watershed auctions
The county-speciﬁc auctions were announced in June 2014 and bids
were accepted between July and September 2014. To generate aware-
ness about the auctions, notiﬁcation letters were mailed to the owners
of all eligible agricultural parcels (nDeﬁance = 507; nFulton = 578).
These letters explained the purpose of the auction and directed land-
owners to a county-speciﬁc website for more information. Using a
postage-paid postcard, landowners could request a bidding packet by
mail. Bid packets were also available at the local SWCD ofﬁces and on
the auctionwebsites. An informationalmeetingwas held in each county
inmid-July. Informational ﬂierswere posted at local grain elevators, and
the auctions were announced in local newspapers, the SWCD newslet-
ters, and Farm Service Agency (FSA) emails that were distributed in
both counties. Reminder postcards were mailed a month prior to the
bidding deadline.0 500 1000 1500 2000 
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Fig. 5. Bids from the experimental auctions for individual direct payment contracts are plotted
axis, kg per yr on top horizontal axis) for four practices implemented on mock (hypothetical)The auctions incorporated an environmental information treatment
that differed between Deﬁance and Fulton counties. Landowners in De-
ﬁance County received a letter indicating the environmental vulnerabil-
ity of one of their ﬁelds (high, moderate, or low). Landowners in Fulton
County received no such information. Based on prior studies, environ-
mental information was expected to boost participation (Glebe, 2013)
and increase bid levels because participants may believe that they can
get moremoneywhen their BMPs generate high ES (Cason et al., 2003).
Land managers were invited to submit bids to adopt three eligible
BMPs, 1)winter cover crops (all varieties), 2) ﬁlter strips, and 3) subsur-
face drainage control structures. Although spring fertilization and con-
servation tillage were included in the experimental auctions, they
were omitted from the real auctions because they cannot be observed
easily for purposes of verifying compliance with a BMP contract. For
the same reason, we did not include reduced fertilizer application as a
BMP. Conservation tillagewas omitted because this BMP is better suited
to control phosphorus attached to soil particles, whereas the goal of the
real auctionswas to reduce soluble reactive phosphorus (SRP) due to its
contribution to Lake Erie HABs. Drainage control structures were added
because of growing farmer interest and their potential to hold back2500 3000 3500 
0 6,000 7,000 8,000 
 Reduction (kgs./yr.) 
 Reduction (lbs./yr.) 
Cover Crop 
Conservation Tillage
No Fall Fertilizer 
against the cumulative total phosphorus (TP) reductions (lbs. per yr on bottom horizontal
farms.
Table 2
Net bids compared to range of direct costs for BMPs implemented on mock farms in experimental auctions. Units are $/ac/yr ($/ha/yr).
BMP Range of BMP implemention costs for
mock farms
Mean net bid Std dev. of net bids Range of net bids
Cover crops [20, 32]
([49.4, 79.1])
6.2
(15.3)
13.4
(33.1)
[−20.0, 31.0]
([−49.4, 76.6])
Conservation tillage [16, 28]
([39.5, 69.2])
−2.5
(−6.2)
10.0
(24.7)
[−23.5, 22.0]
([58.1, 54.4])
Spring fertilizer [0, 3]
([0, 7.4])
9.8
(24.2)
9.4
(23.2)
[−1.0, 38.0]
([−2.5, 93.9])
Filter strip installation [28, 34]
([68.2, 84.0])
−165.2
(408.2)
191.0
(472.0)
[−378.0, 568.0]
([−934.1, 1,403.6])
forgone proﬁt 400
(988.4)
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Lake Erie. All funded BMPs were to be implemented during the follow-
ing year (2015). Contract lengths were 1 year for cover crops and
2 years for ﬁlter strips and control structures. Bids were invited both
from individual landowners and from pairs or groups. In addition to
the bid, participants were required to ﬁll out a management question-
naire describing the ﬁeld and their status quo management regime.
This information was necessary to parameterize the SWAT model so
that it could predict the baseline amount of phosphorus emitted from
individual ﬁelds in order to calculate how much export would be re-
duced by the proposed BMP. Landowners could drop off their bids at
the SWCD ofﬁce or submit via postal mail. All bids were private.
All submitted bids were evaluated via application of the Tifﬁn River
SWAT (TRSWAT)model, whichwas originally developed and calibrated
to provide a ﬁne-scale simulation of hydrology and sediment and nutri-
ent export from agricultural and other lands for more than 900 sub-
basins in the Tifﬁn River watershed (LimnoTech, 2013). The original
HRU representation in the TRSWATmodel was modiﬁed to incorporate
a uniquely deﬁned cropland HRU to represent each individual ﬁeld for
which a bid was submitted. The physical and baseline (i.e., current)
land management characteristics for each bid-derived cropland HRU
were deﬁned based on either ﬁeld-speciﬁc information provided by
the bidder or publicly available spatial datasets. The dominant soil
type and average slope for each ﬁeld-based HRU were determined via
a geographic information services (GIS) analysis of the NRCS SSURGO
soils data layer and a 1-m digital elevation model obtained from the
Ohio Statewide Imagery Program, respectively. Model inputs for ﬁeld
area, crop rotation, and the timing and type of tillage operations and nu-
trient application (i.e., fertilizer) practices were speciﬁed based onFig. 6. A comparison of the average cost per pound of reduced total phosphorus (TP)
export for bids submitted in experimental auctions for four contract types (cost per kg
of TP on right vertical axis). Farmers bid on in-ﬁeld BMPs and ﬁlter strips for mock
(hypothetical) farms. Relative to auctions for individual payment contracts, there is
greater variation in the cost per pound of reduced TP export when farmers bid in joint
contracts; however, there is no statistically signiﬁcant difference in bids.information provided by each bidder. In addition, tile drainage was rep-
resented in the SWAT model for those ﬁeld-based HRUs for which bid-
ders indicated subsurface tile drainage was active.
Following the initial conﬁguration of the TRSWATmodel, a “baseline”
simulation was generated based on the representation of current ﬁeld
conditions, including current management practices documented for
each ﬁeld identiﬁed in the management questionnaire that accompanied
each bid. Next, the ﬁeld-derived HRUs represented in the model were
modiﬁed to represent the implementation of the BMP(s) cited in the sub-
mitted bid(s) for each ﬁeld, and a secondmodel simulationwas executed
to represent BMP conditions for each ﬁeld. The results of the simulations
were compiled and used to calculate the reduction in the export of bio-
available P (lbs/yr) from each individual ﬁeld and to themouth of the Tif-
ﬁn River.
Unlike the experimental auctions, which had ranked bids by cost to
reduce total phosphorus (TP), the Tifﬁn BMP auction ranked bids ac-
cording to cost and predicted reductions in bioavailable phosphorus ex-
port to nearby streams. Bioavailable P is a weighted average that
accounts for 100% of the soluble reactive phosphorus (SRP) and 30% of
the particulate phosphorus (PP). Bioavailable phosphorus was identi-
ﬁed as the target pollutant because this portion of phosphorus drives
algal production in Lake Erie (Baker, 2010). SRP is fully available for bi-
ological processes. PP, including inorganic and organic forms, is sorbed
to soil particles and makes up a large portion of total phosphorus, but
studies of northwestern Ohio rivers have shown that only about 30% of
total PP ultimately becomes bioavailable (DePinto et al., 1981). SRP con-
centrations reported in the literature are highly variable, ranging from
1 μgP/l to greater than 1000 μgP/l (Williams et al., 2015a, 2015b). Three
assumptions about SRP concentrations in tile drains were tested to deter-
mine the effect of this assumption on bid rankings; the three assumptions
were 35, 150, and 500 μgP/l.
Upon receipt of all bids, the ﬁnal ranking of bids was based on
TRSWATmodel runs that were parameterized for the high SRP concen-
tration (500μg P/l) in drain outﬂows (themidpoint of the reported con-
centrations range of 1 - 1,000 μg/l (LimnoTech, 2013; Williams et al.,
2015a, 2015b)). Themost cost-effective bids (lowest cost per pound re-
duction in bioavailable P export) were accepted in rank order until the
budget for that county was exhausted ($25,000 per county). Bidders
were notiﬁed about bid acceptance in mid-November and winning bid-
ders signed contracts prior to December 31, 2014. Land managers with
accepted projects were paid 50% of the payment when the contract was
signed and 50% upon veriﬁcation that the BMP had been installed ac-
cording to the contract.
Follow-up questionnaire
Although not originally planned as part of this research, low partici-
pation in the public auctions prompted a follow-up survey of all nonpar-
ticipants in the auctions. The objective of the follow-up questionnaire
was to identify participation barriers and deterrents for those land-
owners who did not submit a bid in the conservation auction. The
Fig. 7. Tifﬁn BMP auctions covered the areas of Deﬁance and Fulton counties in the Tifﬁn Watershed
Table 3
Summary of bid submission in the Tifﬁn BMP auctions
Unit Fulton Deﬁance Total
Land managers who submitted a bid Bidders 6 4 10
Total number of bids submitted Bids 23a 12b 36
Number of bids for cover crops Bids 19 8 27
Number of bids for drain control
structures
Bids 1 4 5
Number of bids for ﬁlter strips Bids 4 0 4
Total land area proposed to be treated
with BMPs
Acres
(hectares)
998
(403.9)
510
(206.4)
1,508
(610.3)
Total funding requested $ $35,926 $26,620 $62,546
a Twenty-four bidswere submitted, but onewas ineligible because theﬁeldwas located
east of the Tifﬁn watershed.
b Three bids were withdrawn prior to bid evaluation.
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Fulton Co. who were originally invited to participate in the Tifﬁn BMP
auctions but who did not submit a bid. The questionnaire was designed
based on feedback received during the open bidding period of the BMP
auctions. To maximize response rate, the questionnaire was limited in
length to one, two-sided page. Furthermore, most of the questions
could be answered by simply checking a box indicating “yes” or “no.”
The questionnaire is available in Palm-Forster (2015).
The ﬁrst four sections of the questionnaire were designed to identify
factors that inﬂuenced knowledge of the auction, eligibility to partici-
pate, andwillingness to submit a bid. To gauge knowledge, the ﬁrst sec-
tion asked respondents to indicate the sources from which they had
learned about the auction. In the second section, respondents were
asked if they had received a bid packet from a list of sources. Acquiring
a bid packet indicated that the individual hadmade an active attempt to
participate. The third section explored barriers and deterrents to partic-
ipation by providing a list of potential reasons for not submitting a bid
and asking respondents to indicate which reasons applied to them. Eli-
gibility and willingness to adopt were also evaluated in section four in
which respondents were asked to indicate which BMPs they currently
use and the extent of their adoption. The ﬁfth section of the question-
naire used a set of Likert scale questions to elicit landowner attitudes
toward the environment, stewardship, and conservation programs.
The ﬁnal set of questions asked about land ownership and rental as
well as the percentage of household income earned from farm-related
activities.
Questionnaires were mailed using a three contact survey method,
including 1) a cover letter with the questionnaire and one dollarincentive payment, 2) a postcard reminder, and 3) a replacement ques-
tionnaire. Overall, 455 questionnaires out of 1072 were returned. Ten
were returned blank. The response rate was 42% overall, with response
rates of 38% in Deﬁance Co and 45% in Fulton Co. (Palm-Forster, 2015).
Results: Tifﬁn Watershed auctions
Relative to the ﬁrst objective of ﬁeld-testing the reverse auction at
county scale, the auctions yielded important results regarding participa-
tion, and how it affects cost-effectiveness. Participation was very low:
only 1% of invited landowners submitted bids for the Tifﬁn BMP auc-
tions. All bids came from individual bidders; none were submitted by
pairs or groups of bidders. Bids for cover crops ranged from $30 to
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Fig. 8. Contract curves reﬂects bids and associated cost per pound of bioavailable P
reduction submitted in the Tifﬁn BMP auctions (based on 500 μg/l concentration of
soluble reactive P in drain water).
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$31/treated ac/yr ($14.8–$76.6/treated ha/yr), and subsurface drainage
control systems ranged from $1200 to $2000/structure.
A total of ten landowners participated, submitting bids on 36 parcels
of land. Six participants submitted bids in Fulton Co., and four partici-
pants bid in Deﬁance Co. This participation outcome is similar to an
auction conducted in a Kansas watershed in which 12 landowners sub-
mitted 24 bids for BMPs (Smith, Nejadhashemi and Leatherman 2009).
Table 3 presents a summary of bids submitted in each auction. In Deﬁ-
ance County, cover crop bid averages were $36/ac ($89/ha) for cereal
rye, $50/ac ($124/ha) for an oat/radish mix, and $50/ac ($123.5/ha)
for annual ryegrass (weighted by acreage). Bids for drainage control
structures averaged $1700 per structure, and each structure would
treat an average of 23 ac (9.3 ha). In Fulton County, cover crop bids av-
eraged $34/ac ($84/ha) for cereal rye, $35/ac ($86/ha) for clover, and
$50/ac ($124/ha) for oats (weighted by acreage). Oats are not typically
funded as a cover crop in most conservation programs; however, a
SWAT analysis predicted substantial reductions in bioavailable P runoff.
Therefore, the bid was permitted. One bid of $1200 was submitted for a
drainage control structure that treated 8.4 ac (3.4 ha). Four ﬁlter strip
bids were submitted between $75 and $400 per location, which treated
5–53 ac (2–21.4 ha) per ﬁlter strip.
Prior to bid evaluation, one Deﬁance County landowner withdrew
his three bids so he could apply instead to another program. One of
the bids in Fulton County was outside of the Tifﬁn subwatershed and
thus ineligible for the program. Thirty-two bids were evaluated and
ranked to determine which offered the most cost-effective reductions
in bioavailable P export.
After bid evaluation, 29 bids were accepted into the program (20 in
Fulton and 9 in Deﬁance). The funding agency awarded an additional
$651 to Deﬁance County to fund all of the bids. Table 4 provides a sum-
mary of accepted bids. One farmer did not accept his approved contract
for cover crops because he decided hewas not yet willing to try the new
BMP. Low participation led to funding bids with high cost–beneﬁt (CB)
ratios at the margin. Most high CB ratios occurred on ﬁelds where
TRSWAT predicted small reductions in bioavailable P export. Overall
predicted cost-effectiveness for each auction was $302/lb bioavailable
P/yr ($666/kg bioavailable P/yr) in Fulton Co. and $929/lb bioavailable
P/yr ($2048/kg bioavailable P/yr) in Deﬁance Co.
Fig. 8 shows the cost–beneﬁt contract curves for bids submitted in
each auction. As the predicted reduction in bioavailable P export rises,
costs per unit of bioavailable P reduction increase slowly at ﬁrst but
then rise sharply for the lowest ranked bids, creating a hockey-stick-
shaped graph. As noted above, these rankings were based on the base-
line assumed SRP concentration in drain outﬂows of 500 μg/l.
Filter strips were themost cost-effective BMP for bioavailable P mit-
igation. Their average cost of export reduction of $31.53/lb ($69.51/kg)
bioavailable P per year, right in the middle of the range of outcomes
from a similar reverse auction in the Conestoga Watershed in Pennsyl-
vania, where the cost-effectiveness of grassed waterways ranged from
$2.84/lb. ($6.26/kg) to $54.41/lb ($119.95/kg) of reduced total phos-
phorus (Selman et al., 2008). Under the baseline assumption on SRP
concentrations, costs to reduce bioavailable P with cover crops rangedTable 4
Summary of bids accepted in the Tifﬁn BMP auctions.
Units
Total number of bids accepted Bids
Number of bids accepted for cover crops Bids
Number of bids accepted for drainage control structures Bids
Number of bids accepted for ﬁlter strips Bids
Total treated land area accepted
Acres
(hectares)
Bioavailable phosphorus reduction
lbs/yr
(kg/yr)
Total funding requested $from $216/lb/yr ($476/kg/yr) to $4739/lb/yr ($10,448/kg/yr). Costs to
reduce bioavailable P with drain control structures ranged from $406/
lb/yr ($895/kg/yr) to $2310/lb/yr ($5093/kg/yr).
Although ﬁlter strips were the most cost-effective BMP for all levels
of SRP concentration tested, the ranking of cover crops and drainage
management varied considerably. Table 5 shows the effect of three pa-
rameterizations of SRP concentration in drainage tile outﬂows on
a) predicted bioavailable P outﬂows, b) the resulting cost–beneﬁt
ratio, and c) the resulting bid ranking. Drainage management was the
most sensitive to the SRP concentration parameters because SRP is the
main formof P in tile drainagewater. Compared to the baseline SRP con-
centration of 500 μg/l in drain outﬂows, if the assumed SRP level had
been 150 or 35 μg/l, the Fulton County DM treatment would have
dropped from bid rank no. 6 to no. 23 (of 23), while the two leading
DM bids in Deﬁance County would have dropped from no. 2 and no. 3
to no. 12 and no. 11 (of 12), respectively (Table 5).
Low participation in the auctions was associated with the results for
the second and third objectives of the county-scale auctions. No bids
were submitted by pairs or groups of landowners. Likewise, there was
no discernable effect of the environmental information treatment of-
fered in Deﬁance County. Although the mean cost per lb (kg) bioavail-
able P/yr averted in Deﬁance County was observed to be higher (as
one might predict when information about environmental beneﬁts is
revealed), the number of bids submitted was lower (contrary to expec-
tations), and the tiny number of bidders prevents any statistically sound
inferences.
In order to understand what caused such low participation in the
auction, the follow-up survey data were analyzed to identify barriers
and deterrents that limited participation in the auction. The key factors
are summarized in Fig. 9. Two primary barriers were identiﬁed: 1) lack
of information or knowledge of the auction program, and 2) respon-
dents' perceived ineligibility to submit a bid. Conditional on having
knowledge about the auction and being eligible to participate, we iden-
tiﬁed the primary reasons stated for not submitting a bid. Chi-square
tests of independence were used to test for relationships among farmer
characteristics and the reported participation barriers and deterrents.Fulton Deﬁance Total
20 9 29
15 5 20
1 4 5
4 0 4
755
(305.5)
459
(185.8)
1214
(491.3)
50
(22.7)
28
(12.7)
78
(35.4)
$24,924 $25,651 $50,575
Table 5
Effect of three TRSWAT model parameterizations of SRP concentration in drainage tile outﬂows on a) predicted bioavailable P outﬂows, b) the resulting cost–beneﬁt ratio, and c) the
resulting bid ranking for each county. BMPs include the following: CC = cover crop; FS = ﬁlter strip; DM= drainage management.
ID BMP Bioavailable P yield reduction and ranking (at the Tifﬁn River mouth)
SRP concentration in tile efﬂuent = 500 μg/L SRP concentration in tile efﬂuent = 150 μg/L SRP concentration in tile efﬂuent = 35 μg/L
P yield decrease lb/yr
(kg/lb)
Cost:Ben $/lb/yr
($/kg/yr)
Bid
rank
P yield decrease lb/yr
(kg/lb)
Cost:Ben $/lb/yr
($/kg/yr)
Bid
rank
P yield decrease lb/yr
(kg/lb)
Cost:Ben $/lb/yr
($/kg/yr)
Bid
rank
Fulton County
1 FS 12.11
(5.49)
24.76
(54.59)
1 34.35
(15.58)
8.73
(19.25)
1 34.35 (15.58) 8.73
(19.25)
1
2 FS 5.22
(2.37)
28.72
(63.32)
2 14.99
(6.80)
10.01
(22.07)
2 14.99
(6.80)
10.01
(22.07)
2
3 FS 10.50
(4.76)
38.11
(84.02)
3 29.84
(13.54)
13.40
(29.54)
3 29.84
(13.54)
13.40
(29.54)
3
4 FS 1.50
(0.68)
49.85
(109.90)
4 1.49
(0.68)
50.30
(110.89)
4 1.49
(0.68)
50.45
(111.22)
4
5 CC 0.79
(0.36)
215.63
(475.38)
5 0.76
(0.34)
222.87
(491.34)
6 0.75
(0.34)
225.35
(496.81)
6
6 DM 4.30
(1.95)
279.33
(615.81)
6 −3.08
(−1.40)
– 23 −4.51
(−2.05)
– 23
7 CC 5.74
(2.60)
462.19
(1018.94)
7 5.97
(2.71)
444.11
(979.08)
7 5.09
(2.31)
521.31
(1149.28)
8
8 CC 4.77
(2.16)
565.87
(1247.52)
8 18.52
(8.40)
145.80
(321.43)
5 18.82
(8.54)
143.50
(316.36)
5
9 CC 3.09
(1.40)
647.42
(1427.30)
9 1.00
(0.45)
1999.06
(4407.13)
17 0.31
(0.14)
6365.79
(14034.02)
20
10 CC 0.87
(0.39)
1387.15
(3058.11)
10 0.67
(0.30)
1802.92
(3974.72)
15 0.60
(0.27)
1999.87
(4408.91)
17
11 CC 0.62
(0.28)
1413.85
(3116.97)
11 −0.19
(−0.09)
– 21 −0.45
(−0.20)
– 21
12 CC 0.48
(0.22)
1419.92
(3130.36)
12 0.33
(0.15)
2037.81
(4492.56)
18 0.28
(0.13)
2377.79
(5242.08)
18
13 CC 0.23
(0.10)
1578.17
(3479.23)
13 0.21
(0.10)
1781.73
(3928)
14 0.20
(0.09)
1860.59
(4101.86)
16
14 CC 0.58
(0.26)
1707.95
(3765.35)
14 0.44
(0.20)
2224.08
(4903.21)
19 0.40
(0.18)
2469.26
(5443.73)
19
15 CC 1.03
(0.47)
1710.09
(3770.06)
15 2.85
(1.29)
621.79
(1370.80)
10 2.80
(1.27)
631.02
(1391.15)
10
16 CC 1.39
(0.63)
1793.59
(3954.15)
16 1.63
(0.74)
1530.27
(3373.63)
13 1.71
(0.78)
1459.85
(3218.39)
14
17 CC 1.48
(0.67)
2041.81
(4501.37)
17 4.91
(2.23)
616.84
(1359.89)
9 4.91
(2.23)
616.86
(1359.93)
9
18 CC 0.98
(0.44)
2086.92
(4600.82)
18 2.39
(1.08)
858.74
(1893.18)
12 2.34
(1.06)
875.22 (1929.51) 12
19 CC 0.22
(0.10)
2459.13
(5421.40)
19 0.80
(0.36)
686.45
(1513.35)
11 0.80
(0.36)
680.00
(1499.13)
11
20 CC 0.43
(0.20)
2619.94
(5775.92)
20 2.18
(0.99)
518.28
(1142.6)
8 2.23
(1.01)
504.97
(1113.26)
7
21 CC 0.13
(0.06)
4739.31
(10448.28)
21 0.30
(0.14)
1973.51
(4350.8)
16 0.36
(0.16)
1655.98
(3650.77)
15
22 CC −0.54
(−0.24)
– 22 −0.63
(−0.29)
– 22 −0.67
(−0.30)
– 22
23 CC −3.14
(−1.42)
– 23 1.51
(0.68)
2717.58
(5991.18)
20 3.04
(1.38)
1352.22
(2981.10)
13
Deﬁance County
1 CC 0.67
(0.30)
392.69
(865.72)
1 0.30
(0.14)
880.83
(1941.88)
3 0.18
(0.08)
1489.00
(3282.65)
6
2 DM 3.94
(1.79)
405.95
(894.96)
2 −0.59
(−0.27)
– 12 −2.08
(−0.94)
– 12
3 DM 3.64
(1.65)
439.32
(968.52)
3 −0.49
(−0.22)
– 11 −1.85
(–0.84)
– 11
4 CC 0.90
(0.41)
697.54
(1537.80)
4 0.80
(0.36)
790.65
(1743.07)
2 0.76
(0.34)
826.92
(1823.03)
2
5 CC 0.48
(0.22)
698.61
(1540.16)
5 0.59
(0.27)
568.57
(1253.47)
1 0.62
(0.28)
535.80
(1181.22)
1
6 CC 8.71
(3.95)
1019.84
(2248.34)
6 8.41
(3.81)
1055.46
(2326.87)
5 8.32
(3.77)
1067.71
(2353.87)
4
7 CC 1.18
(0.54)
1059.78
(2336.39)
7 1.23
(0.56)
1023.20
(2255.75)
4 1.24
(0.56)
1011.72
(2230.44)
3
8 DM 1.76
(0.80)
1137.18
(2507.03)
8 −0.16
(−0.07)
– 9 −0.79
(−0.36)
– 10
9 CC 5.00
(2.27)
1175.32
(2591.11)
9 4.10
(1.86)
1432.30
(3157.65)
7 3.81
(1.73)
1543.16
(3402.05)
7
(continued on next page)
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Table 5 (continued)
ID BMP Bioavailable P yield reduction and ranking (at the Tifﬁn River mouth)
SRP concentration in tile efﬂuent = 500 μg/L SRP concentration in tile efﬂuent = 150 μg/L SRP concentration in tile efﬂuent = 35 μg/L
P yield decrease lb/yr
(kg/lb)
Cost:Ben $/lb/yr
($/kg/yr)
Bid
rank
P yield decrease lb/yr
(kg/lb)
Cost:Ben $/lb/yr
($/kg/yr)
Bid
rank
P yield decrease lb/yr
(kg/lb)
Cost:Ben $/lb/yr
($/kg/yr)
Bid
rank
10 CC 1.79
(0.81)
1234.67
(2721.95)
10 1.79
(0.81)
1234.67
(2721.95)
6 1.79
(0.81)
1234.67
(2721.95)
5
11 DM 0.69
(0.31)
2310.23
(5093.13)
11 −0.26
(−0.12)
– 10 −0.57
(−0.26)
– 9
12 CC −0.08
(−0.04)
– 12 −0.08
(−0.04)
– 8 −0.08
(−0.04)
– 8
Deﬁance County
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naire, 309 (69%) had some knowledge about the BMP auction. The ma-
jority of respondents reported learning about the auction from the
original letter that was mailed to them to describe the auction. Land-
owners who reported being engaged with conservation agencies were
more likely to have knowledge about the auction, (χ2(1,N=369)=
5.17,pb0.05). Some landowners attributed their lack of knowledge to
not having to make agricultural management decisions because their
land is rented. One respondent wrote, “I have a farmer that operates the
acreage for me, so I do not keep up with all the current happenings.” An-
other noted, “I knew nothing about this… I cash rent.” A chi-square test
conﬁrmed a negative relationship between having knowledge about the
auction and renting out land, (χ2(1,N=388)=8.62,pb0.01), which sug-
gests that landownerswho rent out landmay be less aware of opportuni-
ties to fund conservation practices.
Only new BMPs were eligible for funding. Producers currently using
BMPs could bid to adopt additional (new) practices, but they could not
receive funding for existing BMPs. Nearly 37% of people who knew
about the auction program reported being ineligible because they al-
ready used the BMP(s). Consistent with previous research (Prokopy
et al., 2008), there was a positive relationship between current partici-
pation in another program that pays for BMPs and 1) believing that
farmers' choices affect water quality (χ2(1,N=373)=7.66 ,pb0.01 )
and 2) believing that farmers have a responsibility to protect water
quality (χ2(1,N=373)=5.50 , pb0.05). This result suggests that a
subset of people who are aware of the impact of agriculture on water
quality and have strong environmental stewardship attitudes did notFig. 9. Results of the follow-up questionnaire after the Tifﬁn Watershparticipate in the auction because they were already engaged with pro-
grams that promote BMP adoption, such as NRCS's EQIP.
Six primary bidding deterrents (not mutually exclusive) were re-
ported by the 195 individuals who indicated that they had knowledge
about the auction and were eligible to submit a bid. Seventy-four
(38%) reported that the auction seemed complicated or time consuming
or that they did not understand how to submit a bid. Fifty (26%) respon-
dents stated that they did not want to adopt one of the three eligible
BMPs. Fifty-ﬁve (28%) respondents reported that rental agreements
made participation difﬁcult and 36 (18%) indicated that they did not
bid because they did not think their bid would be accepted. Twenty-
seven (14%) respondents did not bid because the program was a “new
research project” and 10 (5%) reported that they simply missed the
deadline.
Although ﬁfty-ﬁve (28%) of potential participants stated that rental
agreements made participation difﬁcult, this statistic does not capture
the full effect of land rental on auction participation. In total, 109 ques-
tionnaire respondents indicated that land rental was one of the factors
deterring their participation. As discussed earlier, land rental may
reduce awareness of conservation programs. There also seemed to be
confusion about how rental agreements inﬂuenced program eligibility.
Some landowners allow renters to make all farm management deci-
sions. Such respondents typically did not feel like theywere in a position
to participate or were not eligible to bid. One respondent noted, “I rent
allmy land out and they decide how to farm it. I think they do a good job
with conservation.” Another wrote, “Our farm land is under our son's
management – rented to him. Therefore I don't feel I'm eligible.”ed BMP auction show the primary bidding deterrents, n = 445.
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ing with a landowner or renter increased the time and effort required
to submit a bid. One respondent knew about the project and knew he
was eligible to participate, but his land was co-owned and rented out
and he did not want to consult with other decision makers about the
auction. He wrote, “I am one of four family members who own. I did
not want to take the time to consult with them on the project. We
rent the acres to OH area farmer.”
A simulation model of how transaction costs and the perceived
probability of making a winning bid was developed based on ﬁndings
from the follow-up survey of nonparticipants (Palm-Forster et al.,
2016). The model illustrates how burdensome transaction costs can
reduce participation in conservation auctions, thus limiting cost-
effectiveness of auctions relative to more streamlined programs that
target land in high priority areas.
Discussion and conclusions
Innovative agri-environmental programs have the potential to
enhance the provision of ecosystem services (ES), but to be cost-
effective, payments must be allocated to projects that generate the
most beneﬁt given the limited budget for conservation. In this project,
two distinct research stages were designed with an overarching goal
of identifying cost-effective ways to allocate conservation funding for
agricultural practices that reduce phosphorus (P) export to Lake Erie.
In the ﬁrst stage, we used experimental conservation auctions to evalu-
ate farmer preferences for different types of conservation contracts. The
objectives of this stage were 1) to determine which type of incentive
contract resulted in the greatest reduction of P export per dollar of con-
servation funding and 2) to test farmer willingness to bid jointly with
another farmer. In the second stage of research, real conservation auc-
tions were conducted in two NW Ohio counties. Objectives of this
stage were 1) to ﬁeld-test auctions for conservation practices using
cost-effective incentives identiﬁed in stage one, 2) to test the impact
of environmental information on bidding behavior, 3) to analyze farmer
willingness to submit bids jointly or in groups, and 4) to identify partic-
ipation barriers and deterrents that limited bid submission.
Perceived transaction costs affected farmers' preferences among al-
ternative conservation incentives in the experimental auctions and
limited participation in the real auctions. This ﬁnding is consistent
with results from recent studies that have highlighted the negative im-
pact that transaction costs can have on both participation and cost-
effectiveness of agri-environmental programs that pay farmers to pro-
vide environmental services (McCann and Claassen, 2016; Peterson
et al., 2014; Whitten et al., 2013). Results from the experimental auc-
tions suggested that, because of low perceived transaction costs, direct
payments and tax credits were more cost-effective conservation incen-
tives than BMP insurance. The outcomes of the real conservation
auctions and information collected with a follow-up questionnaire re-
vealed how perceived transaction costs of participation can undermine
the theoretical cost-effectiveness of reverse auctions by severely limit-
ing the number of bids submitted. When few bids are submitted, agen-
cies are less likely to be able to identify a set of projects with low costs
per unit of beneﬁt, thus funding may be allocated to less desirable pro-
jects. Preliminary simulations of bidding behavior with plausible pa-
rameters indicate that transaction costs can be major deterrents to
cost-effectiveness of voluntary conservation programs (Palm-Forster
et al., 2016; Palm-Forster, 2015). Finding ways to streamline program
enrollment and lower perceived transaction costs could enhance partic-
ipation and overall performance of voluntary conservation programs as
long as the enrollment mechanism can target and fund high-impact
projects in the watershed.
In the real auctions, land rental proved to be a major deterrent to
participation and responses from the follow-up questionnaire sug-
gested that perceived transaction costs were one barrier that limited
contracts involving rental agreements. Land rental agreementsinherently involve multiple parties, thus requiring additional time and
effort to coordinate efforts in the process of applying for conservation
programs. Mechanisms to reduce the burden of enrolling rented land
are needed to bolster participation in voluntary conservation programs.
This is especially important in the Midwest where more than half of
cropland is rented (National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS),
2014).
Coordinating joint bids also requires additional time and effort,
whichmay explainwhyno joint bidswere submitted in the real conser-
vation auctions. Farmerswerewilling to submit joint bids during the ex-
perimental auctions, but it is unclear whether they would have done so
if theywere bidding to adopt practices on their own land rather than the
mock farms used in the experiments. There may be ways to engage
groups of farmers in auctions or other voluntary programs, but high
costs of coordination, concerns about contract noncompliance, and po-
tential social repercussions generate considerable doubt as to whether
joint contracts are feasible or desirable. Research is needed to identify
if and when it would be beneﬁcial for farmers to coordinate conserva-
tion actions and under what conditions farmers would be willing to
jointly enroll in conservation programs. While controlled experiments
are useful for understanding some farmer behavior, results of this re-
search highlight the value of engaging farmers in ﬁeld experiments
and randomized control trials in which the decisions that they make
have greater consequence in their daily lives. These studies are especial-
ly informative because they reveal observed behavioral responses to
various policy interventions.
Futurework should aim to identify incentivemechanismswithmin-
imal transaction costs that can allocate conservation payments cost-
effectively. One direction for additional research on conservation auc-
tions is to ﬁnd ways to streamline the bidding process by limiting the
amount of information that farmers are required to provide and using
bidding menus or other mechanisms to reduce the cognitive burden
on landowners and farmers. Another direction for future work is to
focus on how to design targeted programs that are informed by bio-
physical models but do not use auctions to allocate conservation
funding.
An original objective of the real conservation auctionswas to test the
impact of providing landowners with information about the potential
environmental impacts of BMP adoption on their farms; however, low
participation limited our ability to draw meaningful conclusions about
this treatment. As discussed in the literature, it is unclear whether this
information would reduce cost-effectiveness because of strategic
bidding or improve performance by expanding the pool of projects
available for funding. Using ﬁeld experiments to test the effect of envi-
ronmental information on participation in voluntary conservation pro-
grams would be a valuable contribution to the literature.
Targeting funding to high priority lands is critical for cost-effective
voluntary programs. Results from both the experimental and real auc-
tions show the value of targeting. Results from the experimental auc-
tions suggest that the inability to spatially target ﬁnancial incentives
to high priority land caused stewardship certiﬁcation to be less cost-
effective than direct payments or tax credits, despite the fact that bids
for the certiﬁcation were no higher than bids for direct payments. In
the real auctions, differences in costs per unit of environmental beneﬁt
were generated not by large differences in bid amounts, but rather by
substantial differences in predicted reductions in bioavailable P export.
In order to target funding effectively, biophysical models must be
able to accurately predict environmental beneﬁts generated by BMPs
throughout awatershed. Awatershedmodel that has been appropriate-
ly parameterized by site-speciﬁcﬂow andwater quality data via calibra-
tion provides a technically defensible tool for quantifying beneﬁts in
terms of reductions in phosphorus (or nitrogen) export from particular
ﬁeld(s) or from a broader region. Further, a watershed model such as
SWAT has the capability to predict the effective delivery of nutrients,
or the effective reduction in nutrients, from the watershed system
(i.e., at the watershed outlet point) to a coastal ecosystem such as
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mation of harmful algal blooms.
While the value of modeling was evident in this study, the applica-
tion of SWAT and other watershed models to support reverse auctions
or other transactions requiring cost/beneﬁt evaluations has several lim-
itations. If a model has not been developed and calibrated for a particu-
lar watershed of interest, a signiﬁcant investment of resources will
likely be needed to develop a tool that can be reliably used to estimate
beneﬁts due to BMP implementation. Further, calibration of a SWAT or
other watershed models requires the availability of sufﬁcient instream
ﬂow and water quality data to appropriately parameterize the model
prior to its use in evaluating BMP effectiveness. If insufﬁcient data
exist for a particularwatershed, development and execution of a stream
monitoring programwill probably be required prior to moving forward
with model calibration and application.
Once a watershed model has been developed and appropriately cali-
brated, detailed information concerningphysical characteristics and crop-
landmanagement practices prior to and after BMP implementationmust
be integrated into the model to evaluate baseline and post-BMP condi-
tions. Additional information requirements contribute to transaction
costs of program application if the farmer is expected to provide detailed
documentation concerning current agricultural management. Advance-
ments in information technologies (e.g., GIS software) and satellite imag-
ery may offer mechanisms to reduce the information burden on the
farmer. Pilot scale tests are needed to ensure that this information can
be used effectively to target funding to high priority areas of awatershed.
A critical data gap that was identiﬁed through the modeling process
for the bids was the SRP concentration in ﬂows routed through subsur-
face tile drainage systems. Although ﬂow through Midwestern tile sys-
tems is reasonably well understood (Boles et al., 2015), recent research
suggests that SRP concentrations in tile ﬂows are highly variable, rang-
ing from 1 μgP/l to greater than 1000 μgP/l (Williams et al., 2015a,
2015b). SRP concentrations in tile drainage are likely to vary through
time (both on an event basis and seasonally) and also among individual
ﬁelds (King et al., 2014). Therefore, in the absence of research quantify-
ing the relationship between tile drainage SRP concentrations and other
ﬁeld-speciﬁc characteristics (e.g., dominant soil type), site-speciﬁc
monitoring is needed to quantify the importance of subsurface tile
drainage as a pathway for bioavailable P export from an agricultural
ﬁeld. The model application discussed here for the Tifﬁn watershed re-
verse auction assumed amid-range concentration from the literature of
500 μgP/l for all ﬁelds evaluated. However, an informal sensitivity anal-
ysis of this assumption indicated that lower assumed SRP concentra-
tions signiﬁcantly altered cost/beneﬁt results for bids where tile
drainage was involved and thus inﬂuenced the ﬁnal ranking of the auc-
tion bids for each county.
In conclusion, we recommend two important directions for future
research aimed at improving voluntary conservation programs in ag-
ricultural watersheds. First, we need to improve measurement of
transaction costs on behalf of both the farmer and conservation
agency and incorporate these costs into cost-effectiveness analysis
in order to identify mechanisms to improve program performance.
Due to the current costs associatedwith implementing conservation auc-
tions, itmaybemore cost-effective to design voluntary programs that tar-
get high-impact land without using an auction to allocate payments.
Second, it is critical that we improve the modeling and measurement
of factors that inﬂuence SRP concentrations in tile drainage systems in
order to more accurately predict the beneﬁts generated by agricultural
BMPs. Developing reliablemodels to predict site-speciﬁc changes in SRP
exportwill enhance our ability to use environmental simulationmodels
to support pay-for-performance policies in Midwest watersheds.
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